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Abstract
We present a new approach to understanding credit relationships between commer-
cial banks and quoted firms, and with this approach examine the temporal change in
the structure of the Japanese credit network from 1980 to 2005. At each year, the credit
network is regarded as a weighted bipartite graph where edges correspond to the rela-
tionships and weights refer to the amounts of loans. Reduction in the supply of credit
affects firms as debtor, and failure of a firm influences banks as creditor. To quantify
the dependency and influence between banks and firms, we propose a set of scores of
banks and firms, which can be calculated by solving an eigenvalue problem determined
by the weight of the credit network. We found that a few largest eigenvalues and cor-
responding eigenvectors are significant by using a null hypothesis of random bipartite
graphs, and that the scores can quantitatively describe the stability or fragility of the
credit network during the 25 years.
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I. Introduction
The credit-debt relation between banks and firms is one of the most important relationships
among economic agents. Credit is a source of profit for a bank, and it is fuel for growth of
a firm. The flip side of the relation is, however, the path where failures take place and their
propagation occurs often at a nation-wide scale, and sometimes to a world-wide extent, as
we experience today.
It is well known that the Japanese banking system suffered a considerable deterioration
in its financial condition during the 1990s. Financial institutions in private-sector had accu-
mulated loan losses, more than 80 trillion yen (nearly 15% of GDP), which reduced the bank
capitalization, and led to the failure of three major and other small banks. Even though two
major banks were nationalized in 1997, and other political decisions were made in order to
maintain the stability of financial system, most banks, major and minor, decreased the sup-
ply of credit immediately; even by reducing existing loans to firms. A lot of firms, especially
small and medium-sized firms, eventually suffered loss of funding. See Brewer et al. (2003).
Financial systems are, at an aggregate level, subject to the tails of distributions for
economic variables. This perspective has been recognized increasingly in economics; personal
income, firm-size, number of relationships among firms and banks (ownership, supplier-
customer, etc.), and so on. It has been recognized that distributions and fluctuations are
the keys for understanding many phenomena in macro-economy (see Aoki and Yoshikawa
(2007) and Delli Gatti et al. (2008)).
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Figure 1: Historical data of the total amount of debt from banks during the calendar
years, 1980 to 2005. For large firms (filled circles) and for small and medium
firms (squares).
Fig. 1 shows the historical data of the total amount of debt from banks for large firms
and for small and medium firms1. For the year 2005, 1.25% (33,833) of domestic firms are
the large firms according to the classification, while the rest 98.75% are the small-medium
firms2. Yet the total loans for the large firms amount to be 160 billion yen, which is nearly
1Source: 2008 white papers on small and medium enterprises in Japan, Small and Medium Enterprise
Agency. Here large firms are the companies capitalized at 100 million yen or more, and small-medium firms
are the others. Calendar years are used here and throughout this paper.
2Source: statistics of corporations by industry, annual report, 1980 to 2005, Ministry of Finance.
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equal to those for the small-medium firms as shown in the figure. Thus, only a small fraction
of firms account for half of all loans. Conversely, as we shall show in this paper, a large part
of loans is provided by a few large banks — the tail of another distribution.
Suppose a large firm is heavily indebted with banks. Then a failure of the firm, or a
default, may cause a considerable effect on the balance sheets of the banks. If the banks
reduce their supply of credit, then the total supply of loans will be decreased resulting in
the adverse shocks to other firms. Therefore, the study of structure of credit relationships or
credit network between banks and firms, and its temporal change would give us an insight
to understand the financial stability or fragility. This is precisely the purpose of this paper.
There are several related works in the literature. For example, Ogawa et al. (2007) carried
out an analysis of dependency of the number of long-term credit relationships on character-
istics of firms. Uchida et al. (2008) studied the relation between bank-size and credit links.
Kano et al. (2006) investigated the credit of small and medium-sized firms. Studies such
as Ogawa et al. (2007) focus on multiple lending relationships. Recently, complex network
analysis (see Caldarelli (2007) and references therein) has been applied to financial systems
(e.g., Inaoka et al. (2004), Imakubo and Soejima (2008), Iori et al. (2007) for inter-bank
relationships, De Masi and Gallegati (2007), De Masi et al. (2008) for bank-firm relation-
ships). In this paper, we shall study on the credit network between banks and large firms
by regarding the network as a weighted bipartite graph, develop quantification of fragility of
banks, and apply it to credit networks in Japan for the past 25 years.
In Section II, we describe our credit network dataset. In Section A, we consider a credit
network as a weighted bipartite graph, and show several statistical properties of heavy-tailed
distributions. Then, in Section B, we propose a set of scores for banks and firms which
measure potential influences that one agent exerts on the other. It is shown that the scores
can be calculated by solving an eigenvalue problem. In Section C, we apply this method to
our dataset from the year 1980 to 2005. The results are discussed in Section IV. Appendix
A: is for proving mathematical properties for the eigenvalue problem which appeared in
Section B.
II. Dataset
Our dataset is based on a survey of firms quoted in the Japanese stock-exchange markets
(Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, Fukuoka and Sapporo, in the order of market size). The data were
compiled from the firms’ financial statements and survey by Nikkei Media Marketing, Inc.
in Tokyo, and are commercially available. They include the information about each firm’s
borrowing obtained from financial institutions such as the amounts of borrowing and their
classification into short-term and long-term borrowings. We examined the period from the
years 1980 to 2005, for which incomplete data are few, and study the time development of
credit relationships by using the total of long and short-term credit.
For financial institutions, we select commercial banks as a set of leading suppliers of credit.
The set comprises long-term, city, regional (primary and secondary), trust banks, insurance
companies and other institutions including credit associations. During the examined period,
more than 200 commercial banks existed, which are summarized in Table 1. We remark that
failed banks are included until the year of failure, and that merger and acquisition of banks
are processed consistently. For quoted firms, we choose only surviving firms that are quoted
in the stock markets mentioned above3.
3Based on the lists of surviving firms and quoted firms in September and December 2007 respectively.
Firms registered on over-the-counter (OTC) market and/or on JASDAQ (the present OTC market) are
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Figure 2: The number of commercial banks and quoted firms.
Table 1: Classification of commercial banks. # denotes the net number of institutions
in each corresponding category during the years, 1980 to 2005. The leftmost
column, a to j, is defined as a short-hand notation.
id Classification #
a Long-term credit banks 3
b City banks 16
c Regional banks 64
d Secondary regional banks 71
e Trust banks 20
f Life insurance companies 23
g Non-life insurance companies 23
h Credit associations (Shinkin banks) 4
i Agricultural financial institutions 4
j Shoko Chukin bank 1
Total 229
The number of banks and firms in each year is summarized in Fig. 2. The classification
of banks and industrial sectors of firms are shown in Table 1 and Table 2 respectively.
The number of banks and firms in each year is summarized in Fig. 2. The classification
of banks and industrial sectors of firms are shown in Table 1 and Table 2 respectively.
excluded. The dataset includes the OTC and JASDAQ data since 1996, so we exclude them also by checking
the listing date of the firms added in the dataset.
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Table 2: Sectors of quoted firms in the dataset. # denotes the net number of firms
in each sector during the years, 1980 to 2005. The total number of the firms
amounts to 2,330.
manufacturing # non-manufacturing #
Foods 105 Marine products 5
Textile products 60 Mining 7
Pulp & paper 18 Construction 148
Chemicals 156 Wholesale trade 233
Drugs & medicines 33 Retail trade 153
Petroleum & coal 11 Securities 18
Rubber products 20 Credit & leasing 75
Ceramic, etc. 49 Real estate 75
Iron & steel 49 Railway transport. 27
Non-ferrous metals 106 Road transport. 28
General machinery 182 Water transport. 15
Electronics 203 Air transport. 4
Shipbuilding 6 Warehousing 38
Motor vehicles 65 Information Tech. 20
Transportation equip. 11 Utilities (electric) 11
Precision instruments 40 Utilities (gas) 13
Other manufacturing 82 Services 264
III. Analysis of Credit Network
A. Credit Network as a Weighted Bipartite Graph
Each yearly statement, or snapshot, of the credit network in our dataset can be regarded as
a bipartite graph. Nodes are either banks or firms4. Banks and firms are denoted by Greek
letters µ (µ = 1, . . . , n) and Latin letters i (i = 1, . . . ,m) respectively. n is the number of
banks, and m is that of firms. An edge between a bank µ and a firm i is defined to be
present if there is a credit relationship between them. In addition, a positive weight wµi is
associated with the edge, which is defined to be the amount of the credit. We can depict the
network as shown in Fig. 3.
Figure 3: Credit network as a bipartite graph. An edge connecting between bank µ and
firm i is associated with an amount of credit wµi as a weight.
4Note that banks are not included in the side of firms, even if they are borrowing from other banks.
Because our dataset includes banks’ borrowing only partially, the interbank credit is not considered here,
though it is no less important than the bank-firm credit studied here.
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wµi is the amount of lending by bank µ to firm i, which precisely equals to the amount
of borrowing by firm i from bank µ. The total amount of lending by bank µ is
wµ :=
∑
i
wµi , (1)
and the total amount of borrowing by firm i is
wi :=
∑
µ
wµi . (2)
We note that a same value wµi has different meanings as a weight to the bank µ and to
the firm i. For example, even if 90% of the total lending of the bank µ goes to the firm i, it
may be the case that i depends on µ by only 20% for all the loans from banks. It would be
natural to define an (n×m) matrix A whose component is given by
Aµi :=
wµi
wµ
. (3)
Aµi represents the relative amount of lending by bank µ to firm i. We have∑
i
Aµi = 1 for all µ . (4)
Similarly, we define an (m× n) matrix B by
Biµ :=
wµi
wi
. (5)
Biµ represents the relative amount of borrowing by firm i from bank µ. We have∑
µ
Biµ = 1 for all i . (6)
The degree kµ of bank µ is the number of edges emanating from it to firms, and the
degree ki of firm i is the number of edges to banks. When the weights wµi are all equal to
1, it is obvious that kµ = wµ and ki = wi.
The distributions for wµ, wi, kµ, ki have long-tails. They are shown, for the data of credit
relationships in the year 2005, in Fig. 4 (a) to (d). The long-tails for the banks’ amount
of credit and number of firms for lending, in Fig. 4 (a) and (c) for wµ and kµ respectively,
are comprised of city banks, long-term credit banks, several of trust banks and insurance
companies (see the classification in Table 1). Similar long-tails are observed for firms, as
shown in Fig. 4 (b) and (d) for wi and ki.
There is a significant correlation between wµ and kµ in a natural way, and also for wi
and ki, as shown in Fig. 4 (e) and (f) respectively. We calculated rank correlation in terms
of Kendall’s τ , which gave significant values of τ = 0.825(16.0σ) and τ = 0.450(28.3σ)
respectively, where σ is the value under the null hypothesis of statistical independence. In
particular, from the Fig. 4 (e), we can observe an empirical relation of kµ ∝ w
a
µ, where a ≈
0.69±0.03 (least-square fit; error 95% level). This implies the relation of wµ/kµ ∝ k
0.44±0.07
µ
meaning that the average loan is larger for the larger degree kµ, or roughly speaking, for the
larger banks. This observation is consistent with known empirical facts (see Uchida et al.
(2008) on similar relation for borrowing by small and medium-sized enterprises).
We refer the reader to De Masi et al. (2008) for extensive study on statistical properties
of credit topology and weights.
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Figure 4: (a) Cumulative distribution P>(wµ) for banks’ lending wµ. (b) P>(wi) for
firms’ borrowing. (c) P>(kµ) for the number of banks’ lending relationships.
(d) P>(ki) for the number of firms’ borrowing relationships. (e) Scatter plot
for banks’ wµ and kµ. (f) Scatter plot for firms’ wi and ki. All the plots are
for the data in the year 2005. In the plots (a),(c) and (e) for banks, the points
are drawn according to the classification given in Table 1. Rank correlations
(Kendall’s τ ) for (e) and (f) are τ = 0.825(16.0σ) and τ = 0.450(28.3σ) re-
spectively (σ calculated under the null hypothesis of statistical independence).
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B. Fragility Scores of Banks
Bank and firm establish a credit relationship for obvious reasons. Bank supplies credit in
anticipation of interest margin, and firm uses credit as an important source of financing in
anticipation of growth in its business. An edge of credit, therefore, represents dependency
of one agent on the other in two ways.
Aµi quantifies the dependency of bank µ on firm i as a source of profit. Also Biµ is the
dependency of firm i on bank µ as a source of financing from financial institutions. The flip
side of dependency is a potential influence which one agent exerts on the other, as we argue
below.
Suppose that one can quantify a change in the level of bank µ’s financial deterioration
by a variable or score, xµ, which is to be defined in a consistent way by the following
argument. Bank µ with increasing xµ will behave in various ways; it may shrink the amount
of its supplied credit, increase interest-rate, shorten the due time of payment by firms, and
so forth. In any case, it would influence firm i to an extent that can be quantified by
Biµ, because it represents the dependency of firm i on bank µ for the source of financing.
Suppose additionally that a change in the level of firm i’s financial degradation is quantified
by another score, yi, it would be reasonable to assume that yi is proportional to Biµ xµ
summed over banks µ, or yi ∝
∑
µBiµ xµ, as the influence from banks to firms. Fig. 5 (a)
illustrates this direction of influence.
Similarly for the reverse direction of influence, from firms to banks. Firm i with yi may
delay its repayment, have defaults, even fail into bankruptcy, and so forth, due to its financial
difficulties. Then the lending banks will not be able to fully enjoy profits in expected amounts
due to the delay, may possibly have bad loans partially, if not totally, for the credit given to
bankrupted firms. Any of them would result in the banks’ financial deterioration, the level
of which was assumed to be quantified by xµ at the outset of our argument. Such influence
to bank µ from firms is reasonably supposed to take the form, xµ ∝
∑
iAµi yi, in a similar
way (see Fig. 5 (b) for illustration).
(a) (b)
Figure 5: Illustration of (a) influence to firm i from banks with an example of weights,
Biµ (µ = 1, 2, 3) satisfying Eq.(6), and of (b) influence to bank µ from firms
with an example of weights, Aµi (i = 1, 2, 3) satisfying Eq.(4).
Expressing the change in the level of financial degradation of them as financial “fragility”,
our consideration above leads us to think about the influence from one score of fragility to
the other by a set of equations which express the influence:
y ∝ Bx , (7)
x ∝ Ay , (8)
where x and y are the vectors with components, xµ and yi, respectively. It then follows that
Px = λx , (9)
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where P := AB, λ is its eigenvalue and x is the corresponding eigenvector. x is the fragility
scores of banks, and y is for firms.
Mathematically, an alternative set of scores could be defined, which we call “dual” scores.
Namely, they are uµ for bank µ and vi or firm i which satisfy
v ∝ ATu , (10)
u ∝ BTv . (11)
This leads to another eigenvalue problem, PT u = λu, or equivalently
u
TP = λuT . (12)
Here and hereafter, T represents the transpose of a matrix or a vector, and we suppose a
vector as a column vector by convention.
Thus, the set x of fragility scores of banks is the right eigenvector of the weight matrix
P as in Eq.(9), and the set u of dual scores of banks satisfies the left eigenvector of P as in
Eq.(12). Since the matrix P is not symmetric, one has a non-trivial relationship between x
and u due to the definitions of P and the weight matrices of A and B. In Appendix A:, we
prove that the left eigenvalues and the right eigenvalues have a same spectrum, and that the
left eigenvector u can be calculated from the right eigenvector x as in Eq.(A.5). We shall
focus only on the fragility score in what follows.
As proved in Appendix A:, the eigenvalues and corresponding eigenvectors have the
following mathematical properties.
• Spectrum of λ
0 < λ ≤ 1 . (13)
• Trivial largest eigenvalue:
λ = 1 if and only if xµ = constant. (14)
• Summation formula of the eigenvalues:
∑
k
λk =
∑
µ,i
AµiBiµ = trP . (15)
We can also interpret the definition of fragility scores in terms of dynamical propagation
of influence. Let us consider a perturbation, or an idiosyncratic shock, that occurs with
a configuration x among banks. It is assumed that the shock propagates by Eq.(7) to
generate y among firms, which in turn affects the banks by Eq.(8). Although we do not
have knowledge on the time-scale for this diffusion process, it would be reasonable to assume
that the structure of credit network does not change much in the meanwhile. Then the
propagation of the perturbation, going back and forth from banks to themselves, could be
described by the repetition of Eq.(7) and Eq.(8), or equivalently, Pr for a finite number of
iterations r.
Suppose that the eigenvalues are sorted in the decreasing order:
1 = λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ λ3 · · ·λn > 0 . (16)
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The subspace spanned by the trivial eigenvector x(1) should be ignored in the consideration
of perturbation, since it merely represents a constant mode. Denote the resulting vector by
x˜, and expand it with respect to the non-trivial eigenvectors as x˜ =
∑n
k=2 ak x
(k), then
Prx˜ = λr2 a2 x
(2) + λr3 a3 x
(3) + · · ·+ λrn an x
(n)
= λr2
[
a2 x
(2) +
(
λ3
λ2
)r
a3 x
(3) + · · ·+
(
λn
λ2
)r
an x
(n)
]
. (17)
This shows that the behavior of perturbation, in a long run r →∞, is determined mainly by
the second largest eigenvalue and its corresponding eigenvector. For a finite r, it is suggested
that one should consider only a few largest eigenvalues and the corresponding eigenvectors.
Therefore, the eigen decomposition of the idiosyncratic shocks, the profile of which is
not known beforehand, can tell us which eigen-modes are important in the propagation of
influence from banks to firms and vice versa in a finite time-scale.
C. Results for the Dataset
One needs to evaluate which eigen-modes are significant. In order to determine the signif-
icance of λ2, λ3, . . . and x
(2),x(3), . . ., we generate random bipartite graphs for comparison
with the real data in the following way.
1. Cut every edge connecting bank µ and firm i. Then, for each original edge, we have
two stubs; one from the bank (bank-stub) and the other from the firm (firm-stub).
2. Retain the original weight wµi on the kµ stubs emanating from the bank µ.
3. Randomly choose a pair of a bank-stub and a firm-stub, and rewire the pair by an
edge.
The 3rd procedure is done so that there is no multiple edge between any pair of bank and
firm. This rewiring procedure alters the weight as wµi → wµj if the edge emanating from µ
to i is randomly connected to j. Note that wµ, kµ and ki are invariant for each µ and i under
rewiring, while wi becomes randomized. Therefore, the matrix A has the same structure
except a permutation of columns. This means that a same amount of credit is supplied by
a bank to a different firm in the randomly generated graphs.
The sum of eigenvalues satisfies Eq.(15). To compare the spectrum λ with that for
random graphs, one has to do so after a normalization. Define a normalized eigenvalue by
λ˜k =
λk
n∑
ℓ=1
λℓ
(18)
Fig. 6 (a) depicts the spectrum obtained for the credit network in the year 2005. By
comparing with the spectrum for random graphs, we can say that only a few eigenvalues
are significant. In this case, they are λ˜2 and λ˜3 (except λ˜1 = (
∑
ℓ λℓ)
−1), while λ˜7 and
subsequent ones are indistinguishable from the spectrum for random graphs.
The corresponding eigenvectors x(2),x(3), . . . have components at a set of banks. To show
this, the components |x
(2)
µ | is depicted in Fig. 6 (b). There are a few peaks at particular
banks, while the same plot for random graphs (absolute value of each component averaged
over 10 randomly generated graphs) is completely different from it.
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Figure 6: (a) Largest 20 eigenvalues λ˜k defined by Eq.(18). Squares are for the credit
network in the year 2005. The points are averages each for 10 realizations of
random bipartite graphs with the standard deviation. (b) The components
of eigenvector |x
(2)
µ | for the actual data in the year 2005 (solid lines). Dotted
lines show absolute values of components averaged over the random graphs.
This also demonstrates that these peaks of |x
(2)
µ | do not simply reflect the distribution for
wµ, because under the randomization of bipartite graphs the configuration wµ is not altered
at all.
We also remark that if one simply takes into account of connectivity throwing away the
information of weights, the resulting eigenvectors have quite different characteristics. This
can be readily verified by assuming that wµ = kµ and wi = ki, that is, by supposing that
wµi = 1 for each edge.
For the historical data from 1980 to 2005, we obtained the spectrum in each year to
see how the eigenvalues change in time. The result is shown in Fig. 7 for the largest two
eigenvalues λ2 and λ3 normalized by Eq.(18). There are a strong peak in the late 80s and a
drop in 1990; also two peaks around 1992 and in 1997.
The relationship between banks and firms changed in the course of the Japanese bubble
(speculative investment into stocks and real estate) in the nation, notably in the late 80s
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Figure 7: The sum (solid line) of the normalized eigenvalues λ˜2 and λ˜3, with their values
(triangles and dotted lines) in each year from 1980 to 2005.
up to 1990 and after the bubble (after 1990) period. Two points should be considered for
understanding what happened in the Japanese credit market during the period. First, firms
were allowed to issue public debt, after financial deregulation, meaning that they were less
dependent on bank loans. Secondly, after the collapse of bubble, banks were left with non-
performing loans, which hindered the intermediary role of banks. The problem of bad loans
affected individual firm’s decision to contract banks. It is known, for example, that during
the bubble period the firms, especially large ones, tended to rely on a single relation, while
in the period of long stagnation after the collapse of the bubble the average percentage of
multiple contracts increases (Ogawa et al., 2007). Banks then spent a decade or longer in 90s
to recover from bad loans experiencing a financial crisis for a couple of years from 1997. In the
late of 1997 and in 1998, three major and other small banks failed. While two major banks
were nationalized, and other political decisions were made for maintaining the stability of
financial system, most banks, major and minor, decreased the supply of credit immediately;
even by reducing existing loans to firms, most notably for small and medium-sized firms.
Our observation in Fig. 7, for the late 80s and an abrupt change in 1990, coincides with
this historical change of the bank-firm relationship. The fragility score in terms of the non-
trivial eigenvalues increased during the period when firms tended to have single relation.
Also, in 1997, banks decreased the total amount of loan during the 90s in attempt to reduce
bad loans systematically. This can be considered to decrease the diversity in the credit
system, resulting in the increase of fragility score.
We also examined the components of eigenvectors, x(2) and x(3), in order to have a look
at how stable or unstable the eigen-structure is during the same period of time. We take the
average to have the information on how large the non-trivial eigenvalues are, in comparison
with that for random graphs, which can measure the fragility of the credit network. Fig. 8
shows the average of |x
(2)
µ | and |x
(3)
µ | for all the existed banks µ (horizontally) in the years
from 1980 to 2005 (vertically from top to bottom). We can observe stable and unstable
periods, and also peaks at particular banks. Notably, unstable pattern can be observed in
the late 80s coinciding the course of the bubble, and also in 90s after the bubble. There are
peaks during these periods as well as for 1997 and 1998, which overlap the financial crisis.
We shall discuss more about the results in the next section.
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Figure 8: Components of the non-trivial eigenvectors, x(2) and x(3), corresponding to
the largest two eigenvalues, during the years from 1980 (top) to 2005 (bottom).
Each row represents the average of |x
(2)
µ | and |x
(3)
µ | by color, while columns are
for µ = 1, . . . , n (n = 229). See Table 1 for the classification of financial
institutions, a (left) to j (right). A cell’s brighter color depicts a larger value.
IV. Discussion
Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 describe the temporal change of the Japanese credit network with respect to
the eigenvalues and corresponding eigenvectors. In order to fully understand our proposed
scores of fragility for banks, one needs to compare the scores with the characteristics of
financial conditions of banks, which can directly measure the level of financial deterioration.
We shall investigate this point elsewhere. Here we relate the obtained results with historical
description on the Japanese banking system in the past 25 years.
The absolute values of the eigenvectors, in Fig. 8, have a relatively stable profile among
banks from 1980 to 1986 and from 2000 to 2005. The profile has peaks at several banks,
notably a few regional banks (in the middle-north geographical region). In the late 80s, the
profile changes dramatically, and spikes are present at two banks, from 1986 to 1989, which
are in the middle-north region and are known to have deteriorated financially during the
period. In the late 80s to 90s, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) altered monetary policy tightening
the policy most notably in 1990. After the bubble collapse, during the 90s, the profile
changed into another configuration. A spike in the classification of h refers to the Credit
associations (Shinkin banks). Then, in the latter half of 90s, the profile went back to the
previous one but with more peaks at other regional banks (especially at secondary regional
banks). The spikes from 2003 to 2005 correspond to three banks in Okinawa.
Though we need more investigation beyond the anecdotal evidence, it is intriguing to
note that several of the spikes in the profiles correspond to failed banks and to banks that
had been merged into larger banks.
Also we note that the peaks and spikes mentioned above are present in same geographical
regions — middle and north regions, and Okinawa. One of the authors (Y. F.) with collab-
orators recently showed that banks can be clustered into groups according to their patterns
of lending to firms (De Masi et al., 2008). In fact, by defining the pattern for bank µ by a
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vector aµ that is equal to a column vector of the matrix A:
(aµ)i := Aµi , (19)
it is possible to define a similarity in the lending patterns for a pair of banks µ and ν,
for example, by the inner product of the corresponding vectors aµ and aν. Then one can
perform the clustering by standard methods including multi-dimensional scaling and hierar-
chical clustering. Indeed, De Masi et al. (2008) showed the minimum spanning tree (MST)
calculated by a similarity measure ignoring the information of weight but considering only
the connectivity from banks to firms. The resulting MST corresponds to clusters of co-
financing relationships of banks, which strongly reflect the geographical regions especially
for the regional banks. It would be interesting to investigate how the eigen-structure is
related to those clusters.
It is also remarked that, as described in Section II, we did not include the firms that went
into bankruptcy. It should be interesting to include them in the credit network in order to
evaluate the effect to banks and to compare the evaluation with the structural change that
followed after the bankruptcy. It would be possible to model such propagation based on our
consideration in defining the scores.
V. Conclusion
We studied the structure and its temporal change of Japanese credit relationships between
commercial banks and quoted firms for the 25 years from 1980 to 2005. Each snapshot of the
credit network is regarded as a weighted bipartite graph, where each node is either a bank
or a firm, and an edge between a bank and a firm is defined to be present if there is a credit
relationship between them. The edge has a weight that represents the amount of credit.
Suppose that a bank shrinks the amount of its supplied credit, a firm as debtor would be
influenced to a certain extent that might be quantified by a matrix that can be calculated by
the weight. Similarly, if a firm fails, then its effect to a bank as debtor would propagate to
an extent that is measurable from the weight. To quantify the propagation, we introduced a
set of score named fragility and its dual, and proved mathematical properties among them.
The set of scores can be obtained by solving an eigenvalue problem.
By comparing the eigen-structure with that obtained in random bipartite graphs, which
have same distributions for degrees of banks and firms and for normalized weight of banks,
we found that the largest few (non-trivial) eigenvalues for the scores are significant. We
performed historical analysis for our datasets, and showed that there are periods when the
eigen-structure is stable or unstable, and that a particular set of banks, mostly a few regional
banks, have large values of the fragility scores. Drastic change occurs in the late 80s during
the bubble and also at the epochs of financially unstable periods including the financial crisis.
Further investigation might be necessary to relate our results based on complex network
analysis to the characteristic of banks, but we believe that our approach is a potentially
valuable quantification of the structure and its temporal change of credit relationships.
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Appendix A:. Mathematical properties of the eigenvalue problem
As shown in Section B, the set x of fragility scores of banks is the right eigenvector of the
weight matrix P as in Eq.(9), and the set u of dual scores of banks satisfy the left eigenvector
of P as in Eq.(12). In this Appendix, we prove mathematical properties on eigenvalues and
eigenvectors.
Let us first show that the score u can be calculated directly from the score x. Eq.(9) is
written explicitly in components as
1
wµ
∑
i,ν
1
wi
wµiwνixν = λxµ , (A.1)
which we rewrite as ∑
i,ν
1
wi
wµiwνixν = λwµxµ . (A.2)
On the other hand, Eq.(12) is
∑
µ
uµ
1
wµ
∑
i
1
wi
wµiwνi = λuν , (A.3)
which, after exchanging µ↔ ν, reads as
∑
i,ν
1
wi
wµiwνi
uν
wν
= λuµ . (A.4)
By comparing Eq.(A.2) and Eq.(A.4), we find that they are equivalent under the identifica-
tion:
uµ ∝ wµxµ . (A.5)
This also proves that left-eigenvalues and the right-eigenvalues have a same spectrum.
Let us consider two sets of eigenvalues and corresponding eigenvectors,
(λ(k),u(k),x(k)) and (λ(ℓ),u(ℓ),x(ℓ)). We have
u
(k)TPx(ℓ) = λ(k) u(k)T · x(ℓ) = λ(ℓ) u(k)T · x(ℓ) . (A.6)
This means that
0 =
(
λ(k) − λ(ℓ)
)
u
(k)T · x(ℓ) =
(
λ(k) − λ(ℓ)
)∑
µ
u(k)µ x
(ℓ)
µ , (A.7)
which, by the use of Eq.(A.5), implies that
0 =
(
λ(k) − λ(ℓ)
)∑
µ
wµx
(k)
µ x
(ℓ)
µ . (A.8)
Therefore, the eigenvectors should be orthonormal under the weight wµ as a metric
5. That
is, ∑
µ
wµx
(k)
µ x
(ℓ)
µ = δkℓ . (A.9)
5Mathematically, x is a covariant vector, u is a contravariant vector, and the metric that connects them
is given by gµν = δµν wµ. The orthogonalization of eigenvectors is done with respect to this metric.
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It follows from Eq.(A.9) the orthonormality:
∑
k
wµx
(k)
µ x
(k)
ν = δµν . (A.10)
This consideration of the inner product implies that we should take a look at the product
of Eq.(A.2) and xµ. This leads us to
λ =
∑
i
1
wi
(∑
µ
wµixµ
)2
∑
µ
wµx
2
µ
. (A.11)
This proves that λ is real and positive, although the matrix P is not symmetric. Also we
have the following inequality that holds for any value of q.
0 ≤
∑
µ
wµi(q − xµ)
2 = wiq
2 − 2
(∑
µ
wµixµ
)
q +
∑
µ
wµix
2
µ . (A.12)
This leads to the inequality for the discriminant:
(∑
µ
wµixµ
)2
− wi
∑
µ
wµix
2
µ ≤ 0 , (A.13)
from which it proves that the largest eigenvalue is 1.
0 < λ ≤ 1 . (A.14)
This proves Eq.(13). It is obvious from Eq.(A.11) that λ = 1 if and only if xµ = q. In fact,
one can easily see, from Eq.(4) and Eq.(6) that xµ = 1 (µ = 1, . . . , n) is the eigenvector
corresponding to λ = 1, provided that the bipartite graph is connected (i.e. any node of
bank or firm is reachable from any other)6. This proves Eq.(14).
In addition, by applying the orthogonal relation in Eq.(A.10) to Eq.(A.2), it can be shown
after a short calculation that the summation formula holds:
∑
k
λk =
∑
µ,i
AµiBiµ = trP . (A.15)
This proves Eq.(15).
To summarize, the eigenvector u can be calculated directly from the eigenvector x. Also
the eigenvalues satisfy 0 < λ ≤ 1, where the largest eigenvalue corresponds to a trivial
eigenvector.
On the other hand, the dual scores, u, corresponding to the largest eigenvalue λ = 1
simply represents the total amount of loans, namely uµ ∝ wµ due to Eq.(A.5), so we can
focus on non-trivial eigenvectors, x(2), x(3) and so on in the main text.
6For a disconnected graph, xµ is constant in each connected components. The multiplicity of λ = 1 is
equal to the number of the connected components.
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